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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has long endorsed the theory of the
“colorblind” Equal Protection Clause, viewing it as a mandate of only
facial equality. Due to rigid doctrine that limits true protection to only
a short, stagnant list of fundamental rights and suspect classifications
and that requires proof of discriminatory intent, only the most blatant,
purposeful inequality is within constitutional reach. Festering outside
of this doctrinal sphere are powerful examples of state actions that
impose disparate impacts on marginalized communities, such as the
nationwide system of laws that disqualify individuals—
disproportionately black men—with felony convictions from the jury
pool.
However, the door to a new approach for combatting such issues
may have recently opened. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme
Court embraced the interconnection between the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to move
beyond the restrictions of current equal protection doctrine and strike
down same-sex marriage bans. This “equal dignity” approach
embraces a different view of equality protection: antisubordination
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theory, which focuses on ensuring substantive equality. This Note
proposes a framework for applying equal dignity, utilizing the example
of felon-juror exclusion to argue that it can serve as a principled
approach for addressing disparate impact claims.

INTRODUCTION
In the early weeks of 2002, a fifty-four-year-old man named Sims
was called for jury duty in an aggravated assault case. 1 He entered the
courthouse that day prepared to join his fellow citizens in fulfilling their
civic duty as part of “the spinal column of American democracy.”2
Upon arriving, however, he found himself challenged and removed
from the jury pool for a surprising reason: under a Texas statute, he
was disqualified from jury service because of a crime he had committed
thirty-seven years earlier. 3 In 1965, Sims, then seventeen years old, was
convicted of misdemeanor theft, a crime for which he served probation
and paid a hundred-dollar penalty. 4 Now an adult running a retail store
of his own, Sims was told by the trial court judge that “our law is so
clear that . . . even a minor theft of a piece of bubble gum, if it got a
conviction, it means you can’t serve on a jury.” 5
Sims learned a startling fact that day—he was one of the many
millions of Americans who are statutorily excluded from jury service.
Currently, a federal statute prohibits individuals who have been
convicted of a felony from being included in federal court jury pools.6
This ban is lifelong and can only be abated by restoration of the
individual’s civil rights.7 In addition, forty-nine states currently have
laws disqualifying individuals with certain criminal convictions from
jury pool eligibility, with Maine being the lone exception. 8 Thirty-one
1. Robertson v. State, No. 07-02-0109-CR, 2003 WL 1872934, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 11,
2003).
2. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
3. Robertson, 2003 WL 1872934, at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012) (declaring ineligible for service on a grand and petit federal
jury anyone who “has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted
in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year and his civil rights have not been restored”).
7. Id.
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1211 (2013) (specifying qualifications for jury service
without mentioning prior criminal conviction). Colorado has no restriction on felons serving on
trial juries but does disqualify them from grand jury duty. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-105(3)
(West 2016) (“A prospective grand juror shall be disqualified if he or she has previously been
convicted of a felony.”).
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of those states have lifelong bans on state court jury pool eligibility for
individuals who have been convicted of a felony, 9 while eighteen states
have juror-qualification laws that specify the length of bans placed on
those with prior felony convictions, ranging from release from prison
all the way to the obtainment of an official pardon. 10 Thirteen states
even disqualify individuals with certain misdemeanor convictions. 11
Given how widespread they are, these laws unsurprisingly
disqualify a large percentage of the American population from jury
service. 12 Although quantifying the exact number of felons in the
United States is tricky, 13 a 2016 study put the number as high as 23
million people. 14 Even estimates on the lower end of the scale suggest
that up to 16 million Americans may be statutorily banned from the
federal jury pool as a result of convictions at both the state and federal
levels. 15
Perhaps more importantly, however, these exclusion laws have a
malignant effect that might not be immediately apparent: they create a
harsh, disparate impact on communities of color. 16 Although only

9. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons From Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67
(2003); see also Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records
Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 419–24 (2016) (listing state laws).
10. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions,
98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 596 (2013).
11. Id. at 597. Some states also disqualify those who have been charged with, but not yet
convicted of, such offenses. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16 (West 2018) (allowing
challenge for cause for jurors convicted, indicted, or under “legal accusation” of either a felony
or misdemeanor theft).
12. As described above, juror-eligibility laws often exclude both individuals convicted of a
felony and individuals convicted of certain misdemeanors. Since felons are excluded by the
federal government and by forty-nine states, this Note focuses on individuals convicted of felony
offenses and refers to the impacted individuals as “felons” for internal consistency. The same
arguments advanced below apply to individuals excluded from the jury pool due to misdemeanor
convictions.
13. Kalt, supra note 9, at 168–69.
14. Nicholas Eberstadt, Why is the American Government Ignoring 23 Million of its
Citizens?, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-theamerican-government-ignores-23-million-of-its-citizens/2016/03/31/4da5d682-f428-11e5-a3cef06b5ba21f33_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.767ce57af9ef
[https://perma.cc/R3Y4T8AY].
15. Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the
Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 304
(2006).
16. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 192 (2005) (describing the disparate impact on the Latino
community); Kalt, supra note 9, at 67 (describing the disparate impact on the black community).
In order to narrow its scope, and to rely on the best available statistics, this Note focuses on the
disparate impact that juror exclusion has on the black community.
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around 6 percent of nonblack Americans have been convicted of a
felony, 17 around 20 percent of all black adults—and perhaps more than
33.3 percent of all black men—have been convicted. 18 Most would
therefore be banned from the jury pool for life. 19 As a result, an
estimated 29 to 37 percent of black men are currently excluded from
the federal jury pool. 20 Because of this racially disparate exclusion,
although only 12.6 percent of the American population is black, 21 one
study suggests almost 30 percent of excluded potential jurors are. 22
This imbalance likely has serious impacts on the American legal
system. The historic social science findings have been inconsistent in
assessing the impact of the racial composition of juries on trial
outcomes, 23 but more recent research shows that white mock jurors in
diverse groups are less convinced of a black defendant’s guilt than
white mock jurors in all-white groups. 24 The warping effect of all-white
juries distorts many aspects of jury behavior; one study demonstrates
that there are significant variations in the deliberations, openness to
evidence, consideration of racial issues, and analytic behaviors of allwhite juries as compared to their racially mixed counterparts. 25

17. Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948 to
2010,
at
7
(Working
Paper,
2011),
http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687
[https://perma.cc/CDL4-K3KM].
18. Uggen, Manza, & Thompson, supra note 15, at 283.
19. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 171 (stating that while these estimates might not perfectly
describe the number of black men excluded from jury service, they are “consistent with other
estimates in other contexts”).
20. Id. at 113.
21. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS: SUMMARY POPULATION
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 4 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-1-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5NB-KY4Y].
22. Kalt, supra note 9, at 170.
23. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
201, 208 (2001) (summarizing research on racial composition of juries and on racial bias in jury
results).
24. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCH. 597, 603–04 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 111–12
(1990) (discussing research indicating that all-white juries are likely to find that identical evidence
is sufficient to convict a black defendant but insufficient to convict a white defendant); Samuel R.
Sommers, Race and Juries: The Effects of Race Salience and Racial Composition on Individual
and Group Decision-Making 97–107 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Michigan) (finding that racially mixed mock juries deliberated longer, discussed more potential
issues, and considered racial issues more often than all-white juries).
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A 2012 study analyzed the impact of the jury’s racial composition
on trial outcomes in Florida between 2000 and 2010, with unsurprising
results. The researchers concluded that the “impact of the racial
composition of the jury pool on trial outcomes is statistically
significant,” and that “there is a significant gap in conviction rates for
black versus white defendants when there are no blacks in the jury pool
. . . [which] is eliminated when there is at least one black member of
the jury pool.” 26 Specifically, when there were no potential black jurors
in the pool, black defendants were convicted of at least one crime at a
rate of 81 percent, as opposed to a conviction rate of only 66 percent
for white defendants. 27 However, when there was at least one black
juror introduced into the jury pool, conviction rates for black
defendants dropped to 71 percent, a rate almost identical to that of
white defendants. 28
This system has helped to create a self-perpetuating cycle. Black
adults, particularly black adult men, are convicted of crimes at higher
rates due in part to racial disparities in policing, selective enforcement
of the law, and different levels of success in navigating the complexities
of the criminal justice system. 29 Once convicted, they are excluded from
the jury pool, creating less diverse juries, which then convict black men
at higher rates. This is a serious issue, especially given the already high
level of distrust in the legal system generally and nondiverse juries in
particular. 30 This cycle of juror exclusion poses a genuine threat to “the
public’s faith in the legitimacy of the legal system and its outcomes.” 31

26. Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in
Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1019–20 (2012).
27. Id. at 1032.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 171, 195–98 and accompanying text (discussing racial disparities in
policing and outcomes within the criminal justice system).
30. HARVARD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes
Towards Politics and Public Service 29th Edition (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Harvard IOP Spring
2016 Poll], http://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/harvard-iop-spring-2016-poll (almost two-thirds of
18- to 29-year-old black respondents had no confidence “in the U.S. judicial system’s ability to
fairly judge people without bias for race and ethnicity”); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies,
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and
Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 645, 665 (1997) (discussing a poll in which 67 percent of respondents believed that racially
diverse juries reach fairer decisions than single-race juries).
31. Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering
and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2003); see also Johnson, supra note
16, at 158 (“Racially skewed juries undermine the perceived impartiality of the justice system and,
at the most fundamental level, the rule of law.”).
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Despite a recent increase in scholarly attention given to this issue,
the legal research and scholarship surrounding these bans has
remained “scant.” 32 And, significantly, traditional constitutional
jurisprudence has not provided a means to challenge them; attempts to
mount constitutional challenges to felon-juror exclusion have routinely
failed. 33 Perhaps the most important roadblock has been the current
jurisprudence interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. 34 In recent decades, the Court has constrained the
Equal Protection Clause by emphasizing the facial neutrality of
challenged laws 35 and by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that
discriminatory intent underlies seemingly neutral laws. 36 By relying on
these constraints, the Court has enforced a particular theory of the
constitutional harm that the Equal Protection Clause is meant to
remedy: the “colorblind” equal protection theory. Making use of this
theory, the Court has been reasonably consistent in recent decades in
striking down state actions that are imbued with improper biases where
intent to discriminate based on a suspect classification can be shown. 37
But when this intent is not provable, the Court has generally refused to
intervene—even despite persuasive evidence of the disparate impact
and genuine harm caused by the state action. 38
An alternative approach, antisubordination theory, focuses on
“whether a law advances substantive equality by analyzing ‘the
concrete effects of government policy on the substantive condition of
the disadvantaged.’” 39 Courts making use of this theory would consider
the tangible impact of government policy to determine whether true
equality is being furthered, rather than simply concentrating on
blatant, outright discrimination. The Court’s decision to instead focus

32. James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on
Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 20–24 (2018).
33. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 75–99 (analyzing the failures of different challenges to felonjuror bans).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
35. Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 64,
66–67 (2016).
36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (establishing the discriminatory
intent requirement).
37. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
39. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 320 (2009) (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1454 (1991)).
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on suspect classifications and discriminatory intent has allowed
inequality to fester, unchecked, throughout our society and legal
system. The exclusion of felons from the jury pool is just one example
of substantive equality being thwarted by overly constrictive
constitutional doctrine.
However, a new approach to equality may have been laid out in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 40 which declared state bans on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional. 41 In an opinion that largely disregarded
traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
focused on the interwoven nature of due process and equal protection
within the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 The Court used this combined
lens of two constitutional protections to analyze, and strike down,
same-sex-marriage bans. 43 Through this recognition of the
Amendment’s interconnected clauses, Obergefell’s reasoning may
finally provide an avenue for easing the colorblind theory’s chokehold
on the doctrine and rethinking the Court’s approach to disparate
impact claims.
This potential new approach, which this Note refers to as “equal
dignity,” 44 firmly embraces the ideals of antisubordination. 45 In fact,
Professor Laurence H. Tribe argues that “in recognizing that
even unintended effects can render a traditional practice or definition
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, Obergefell may well
have laid the foundation for reexamining” the discriminatory intent
requirement. 46 Although the equal dignity approach has not yet been
applied outside of the gay rights context or explicitly acknowledged by
the Supreme Court, and although the recent changes in the Court’s
composition raise questions about the continued viability of
Obergefell’s reasoning, this explication of how equal protection and

40. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
41. Id. at 2607.
42. Id. at 2603.
43. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17
(2015).
44. This is the name given to it by Professor Laurence H. Tribe. Id. The name is presumably
taken from Obergefell’s closing lines: “They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The
Constitution grants them that right.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (emphasis added). Other
scholars have given it different labels. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence
of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025
(2004) (describing it as a “jurisprudence of tolerance”).
45. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom? Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147,
174 (2015) [hereinafter Yoshino, A New Birth].
46. Tribe, supra note 43, at 19.
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due process concerns coexist provides an opportunity for advocates
and courts to approach racial inequality in a new way. 47
This Note argues that Obergefell’s equal dignity approach can be
utilized in analyzing disparate impact claims under the Equal
Protection Clause, and that it provides a principled means for striking
down laws like those excluding felons from jury service. Part I discusses
the current state of equal protection doctrine and describes the ways in
which it has failed to fully combat inequality. Part I also analyzes the
failed attempts to combat exclusion laws in court. Part II discusses the
Obergefell opinion, outlines a proposed framework for the equal
dignity approach, and addresses the potential impact of recent changes
in the Supreme Court’s composition on equal dignity’s future
relevance. Finally, Part III provides an example of equal dignity
analysis, applying it to laws excluding felons from the jury pool and
concluding that the harshest of these laws violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF A COLORBLIND EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause declares
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” 48 The motive of the Amendment’s
authors was straightforward—their intent was to protect the rights of
former slaves 49 and ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. 50 Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, when introducing the
Fourteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives, described its
aspiration as nothing less ambitious than “the amelioration of the
47. See, e.g., Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119,
1122 (2017) (proposing “that equal dignity is one theory of Equal Protection that can explain
when governmental stereotyping is unconstitutional”).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. See Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment,
36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 686–87 (2003) (noting that the congressional Joint Committee on
Reconstruction concluded that “nothing short of a constitutional amendment—what became the
Fourteenth Amendment—would protect the rights of the former slaves”).
50. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968); see also Michael W. McConnell,
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1997) (“The clearest and most
indisputable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional authority for
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which outlawed the Black Codes.”). The Fourteenth Amendment
ensures this constitutionality by enshrining not only the protections embodied in the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, but also by ensuring that Congress has the authority to enforce
those protections through legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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condition of the freedmen.” 51 The Amendment was passed as a way “to
atone for our nation’s own original sin and extend our Constitution’s
promises to all citizens.” 52
Put simply, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses were adopted so that America might begin the
process of making amends for the evil of slavery. State actions that
inflict a disparate impact on nonwhite communities continue to
perpetuate related racial stratification in America; 53 they should not be
ignored by the courts simply because they are facially neutral. A more
remedial Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is required—one that
can effectively rectify the serious inequality that yet remains and that
is consistent with the race-conscious approach of the Amendment’s
drafters. 54 As the Obergefell Court recognized, “when the rights of
persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
decisionmaking.” 55
A. Contemporary Equal Protection Doctrine
Despite the race-conscious, remedial purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and despite the often heated debate over the true

51. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
52. Tribe, supra note 43, at 21. Admittedly, the Amendment’s authors also had their
continued political control in mind. Reconstruction Republicans were specifically worried that
Southern Democrats would use their potentially increased numbers in the House of
Representatives—a result of the Thirteenth Amendment causing freed slaves to be counted when
determining representation—to take control of the national legislature, all while suppressing the
actual ability of freed slaves to engage in the political process. These political concerns likely lead
to the inclusion of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for the reduction of
representation if a state improperly denies individuals the right to vote. WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 45–49
(1988).
53. Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129–30 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects].
54. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 988 (2012)
(“The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted race-conscious measures
designed to ameliorate the condition of former slaves.”). For a detailed description of the
decidedly not “colorblind” actions of Congress in the years immediately following the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment, see generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (describing various raceconscious programs enacted by Congress).
55. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1637 (2014)).
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meaning of equality, 56 the Court has consistently interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause as mandating only formal, de jure equality. 57 Indeed,
the Court has treated any “race-conscious government action [as]
presumptively unconstitutional.” 58 The Court has gone a step further
than using this rule to attack harmful racial discrimination alone;
rather, the foremost principle of the existing equal protection
jurisprudence is the “commitment to protect individuals against all
forms of racial classification, including ‘benign’ or ‘reverse’
discrimination.” 59
This rule of colorblindness is intended to eliminate the ability of
the state to make any decisions based on race or other suspect
classifications. 60 Though earlier equal protection cases like Brown v.
Board of Education 61 did not mention colorblindness, it has long since
come to dominate the Court’s equal protection approach. 62 Despite
thorough criticism, a majority of the Court has apparently viewed it as
an effective standard. 63
Within this colorblind approach, two doctrinal methodologies
serve as additional hurdles to achieving true equal protection. First, the
colorblindness approach analyzes discrimination through a system of
suspect classifications and related tiers of scrutiny. 64 If a state action

56. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 956–59 (2002); see
also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 n.3 (1987) (providing examples of scholarly debate regarding
the merits and weaknesses of Washington v. Davis and discriminatory intent requirements); Reva
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1288 n.23 (2011) (providing examples of the antisubordination
debate in equal protection doctrine).
57. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity
Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017).
58. William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2, 5
(2011).
59. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) (emphasis added).
60. Boddie, supra note 35, at 66–67.
61. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987–88 (2007) (describing the current equal protection
jurisprudence as a colorblind approach).
63. Compare Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All Else: Race, Sex, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1011 (1986) (discussing why the colorblind approach to equal
protection is incorrect and should be replaced with antisubordination), with Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1130 (“[T]he Court is confident that it has
abolished segregation and granted African-Americans equal protection of the laws.”).
64. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 717–23 (3d
ed. 2009).
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discriminates on the basis of a suspect classification or on the exercise
of a fundamental right, it receives either strict or intermediate scrutiny.
These forms of heightened scrutiny closely analyze the challenged state
action and provide a significant chance of victory for the plaintiff. 65
However, if a particular state action “implicates neither a nonprotected
classification, nor a fundamental right,” it receives rational basis
review, 66 the most lenient and government-friendly standard of
scrutiny. 67 This tiered structure therefore both fails to protect plaintiffs
who have been discriminated against in the exercise of a
nonfundamental right, and fails to protect against discrimination that
is not based on a previously recognized suspect classification.
Second, the Court has narrowly defined the forms of state action
that it views as impinging upon equal protection, even where suspect
classifications are implicated. The pivotal principle behind this move is
the discriminatory intent requirement outlined in Washington v.
Davis 68 and its progeny. 69 Under this rule, even substantial proof that
state action disparately impacts members of a suspect classification is
not enough to show an equal protection violation. 70 Instead, a plaintiff
alleging an equal protection violation must provide evidence of either
facial discrimination in the statute’s language or discriminatory intent
65. Id. at 744.
66. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 743
(2014).
67. See id. at 743–44 (explaining that “plaintiffs overwhelmingly lose” under this deferential
standard).
68. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
69. Washington v. Davis, on its own, did not necessarily spell the end of constitutional
disparate impact claims. In fact, the Court there acknowledged that evidence of disparate impact
could help demonstrate discriminatory intent, id. at 242, and in a case the next year, the Court
included “the impact of the official action” on a list of factors to consider in determining
discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–
68 (1977). However, the Court reversed course two years later and “defined ‘discriminatory
purpose’ so stringently that it made . . . disparate impact, almost irrelevant.” Kenji Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection]. The Court held that:
“Discriminatory purpose[]” . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because
of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Pers. Admin’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations omitted).
70. The Washington v. Davis Court stated:
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does
not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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behind it. 71 As the Court stated shortly after Washington v. Davis,
“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a
racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” 72
Difficulties have arisen under this colorblind approach, perhaps
most noticeably in the debates about racial considerations in
education. 73 However, the colorblind approach has been effective in
recent decades at combatting the more extreme examples of facial
discrimination. From canonical cases like Loving v. Virginia 74 and
Brown, 75 to more recent cases involving discrimination based on sex, 76
national origin, 77 and the ability to exercise a fundamental right, 78
outright discrimination based on protected classifications is struck
down with reasonable consistency.
Nonetheless, these two hurdles have drastically limited the scope
and reach of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has only extended
heightened scrutiny to five suspect classifications: race, national origin,
alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage. 79 In fact, the Court has not
declared a new suspect classification since 1977, 80 and it has since
consistently refused to accord this protection to other seemingly

71. Id. at 246–48 (declining to adopt Title VII’s disproportionate impact basis for
discrimination claims as the standard for analyzing constitutional equal protection claims).
72. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
73. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 706–07 (2007)
(striking down a school district’s decision to include race considerations in school admissions in a
split 4-1-4 vote); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for
Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 185–88 (2016) (discussing the
ongoing debates surrounding affirmative action and its current legal status).
74. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination”).
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
76. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex discrimination must be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids differential treatment based on sex).
77. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that national origin classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection).
78. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that Virginia’s poll tax
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
79. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 756 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 766–67, 769 (1977)).
80. Id. at 757 (citing Trimble, 420 U.S. at 766–76).
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deserving groups. 81 Regardless of the reason for this reticence, 82 the
decades since the last expansion of suspect-classification protection
likely means that its scope is limited to the groups that are currently
protected.
More important for this Note are the difficulties caused by the
discriminatory intent rule. In practice, the Court has essentially
required proof that the purpose underlying a state action is
“tantamount to malice.” 83 Predictably, this has been an extremely high
barrier for litigants to cross. As the Court itself has acknowledged,
“[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic
undertaking,” 84 and “[t]he distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to
make.” 85 The discriminatory intent rule has therefore led courts to
uphold a large variety of state actions that, though facially neutral, had
undeniable disparate impacts. 86 In practice, constitutional protection is
81. Id. at 756–57 (listing age, physical and mental disability, and sexual orientation as some
of the most notable examples of potential suspect classifications that have not been recognized,
despite ample opportunity).
82. Professor Kenji Yoshino argues that this is a reaction to “pluralism anxiety” in which
societal unease over the nation’s expanding pluralism and the impacts of increasing formal
protections of equality for more groups caused the Court to restrict constitutional protection to a
very small and specific set of groups. Id. at 758–59. He provides an example of these concerns in
action, where the Court refused to declare a new suspect classification:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect
for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities
setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public
at large.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 445 (1985)).
83. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1113.
84. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982)).
85. Miller v. Johnson, 115 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term — Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1976)
(noting that “[i]f courts may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record,
many instances will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot be
proved”).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 710–11 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding federal
sentencing guidelines that provide significantly harsher penalties for crack cocaine than for
powder cocaine, despite national statistics showing that 92.6 percent of those convicted of crack
cocaine charges were black). One of the most pressing examples of this indifference to disparate
impact is McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge by a black man who had been sentenced to death, despite statistical evidence of racial
bias in sentencing decisions. Id. at 297. Admittedly, the death penalty may more directly implicate
the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
However, if evidence of racial bias or disparate impact in sentencing is strong enough, the death
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often simply unattainable if government legislators and actors are
clever enough to hide any potentially discriminatory purpose behind
the cover of a legitimate aim; they almost always are. 87
B. The Failed Attempts to Challenge Juror Exclusion
The Court has admittedly taken some strides toward combatting
the pernicious impact of racial discrimination in the jury box. In 1879,
the Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause, states may not
ban black jurors. 88 And more recently, in Batson v. Kentucky, 89 the
Court instituted a framework that requires prosecutors to provide raceneutral explanations for using peremptory strikes to remove black
jurors when the defendant has made a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination. 90
Despite this progress, litigants have been consistently unsuccessful
in challenging juror-exclusion laws. 91 Numerous defendant-focused
claims based in the Sixth Amendment’s cross section requirement 92
and in procedural due process 93 have failed. But most important for

penalty—which involves the ultimate fundamental interest, life—would likely be struck down
under the equal dignity approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.
87. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1135 (“[L]egislators
do not make a practice of justifying legislation on the grounds that it will adversely affect groups
that have historically been subject to discrimination.”). Another scholar describes this as a “long
tradition of Supreme Court decisions imposing unattainable burdens of proof in order to deny
and avoid claims of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.” David Baldus,
George Woodworth, John Charles Boger & Charles A. Pulaski, McClesky v. Kemp: Denial,
Avoidance, and the Legitimization of Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 229, 263 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
88. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
89. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
90. Id. at 97.
91. See James L. Buchwalter, Disqualification or Exemption of Juror for Conviction of, or
Prosecution for, Criminal Offense, 75 A.L.R. 5th 295, §§ 3[b]–6 (2000) (summarizing failed
constitutional challenges to felon-juror exclusion).
92. The cross section requirement, at its most general, mandates that “juries must be drawn
from a broadly representative pool” of the community. Kalt, supra note 9, at 75. As the Court has
explained, the requirement extends from the concept “that the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). However, the Court has more
recently made clear that this requirement “is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which
the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).” Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 480–81 (1990) (emphasis in original). Under this view of cross section analysis,
challenges brought against felon-exclusion laws have been unsuccessful. Kalt, supra note 9, at 75–
88 (describing the cross section requirement in the felon exclusion context, and surveying the
results of cross section challenges).
93. Id. at 92–94 (describing the complications with procedural due process challenges and
their usual connection with Sixth Amendment claims).
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this Note is the failure of claims that juror-exclusion laws violate equal
protection. These claims have generally been made in two manners: (1)
juror-exclusion laws violate equal protection through their disparate
impact on black potential jurors, and (2) they violate the equal
protection rights of felons as a class. 94
The failures of the first argument have been rather
straightforward—the discriminatory intent requirement of Davis has
served as a universal stumbling block, 95 with even the most persuasive
statistics about the disparate impact of these juror-exclusion laws
proving futile. The laws are facially neutral with regard to race, 96 and
the common-law history of exclusion extends back “long before black
people—felons or non-felons—had any chance to serve on juries,”97
making it exceedingly difficult to show discriminatory intent. The
similarly consistent failures of the second argument have rested on two
simple bases: “[n]o court that has considered the question of whether
being eligible for jury service is a constitutional right has answered in
the affirmative,” 98 and felon status is not a suspect classification. 99
Therefore, courts have applied rational basis review, consistently
holding that the laws are constitutional. 100 Given the Court’s reticence
toward declaring new rights and suspect classifications, neither of these
roadblocks seems likely to move. 101
II. OBERGEFELL AND EQUAL DIGNITY
State actions like the exclusion of felons from the jury pool can
create widespread harm that current constitutional jurisprudence is
simply incapable of remedying. However, Obergefell may have
provided a new opportunity for advocates. This Part analyzes that
holding and outlines the equal dignity approach that follows from its
reasoning.

94. Id. at 88.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting an equal
protection claim due to the lack of proof of discriminatory intent).
96. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012) (excluding any mention of race in a federal jury
statute that provides that a person is unqualified to serve on a jury if he has a pending charge or
conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for at least one year).
97. Kalt, supra note 9, at 91; see also id. at 172–76 (discussing the development of jury
exclusion in the English legal system from the fourteenth century onward).
98. United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
99. E.g., Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying rational
basis review and upholding a federal law that excludes felons from jury service).
101. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
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A. Obergefell v. Hodges
The Court’s decision in Obergefell did not occur in a vacuum. Over
the previous quarter of a century, the Court had grappled with gay
rights issues and with the concept of dignity in a series of cases. The
most recent of these cases, United States v. Windsor, 102 was an
important step in this process, but its holding was an idiosyncratic
decision based in federalism concerns. 103 The two cases prior, however,
help elucidate Obergefell’s approach.
The first of these cases, Romer v. Evans, 104 assessed the
constitutionality of a Colorado referendum amending the state
constitution to entirely forbid any governmental or judicial protection
of gay, lesbian, or bisexual people on the basis of their sexual
orientation. 105 Rather than declaring sexual orientation a suspect
classification, the Court applied rational basis review and came to what
was then a surprising conclusion—even under this most deferential
standard of scrutiny, the Colorado referendum violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 106 Apparently unwilling to extend the reach of equal
protection, but equally unwilling to let such blatant discrimination
stand, the Court arguably warped the rational basis standard to strike
down the amendment. 107
Six years later, the Court returned to the arena of gay rights in
Lawrence v. Texas. 108 Faced with a Texas sodomy statute similar to one
it had previously upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 109 the Court explicitly
overruled that precedent and struck down the statute as a violation of
due process. 110 In a passage that presaged the more expansive

102. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
103. See id. at 775 (explaining that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was invalid because
it sought to disparage persons that a state had deemed worthy of protection).
104. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
105. Id. at 624.
106. Id. at 632.
107. This surprisingly stringent application of rational basis review has since been referred to
as an example of “rational basis with bite.” E.g., Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws
of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769,
2770 (2005) (citing Gayle Lynn Pattinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987)).
108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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explanation that would come twelve years later in Obergefell, 111 the
Court stated that “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects.” 112
Lawrence also illustrated the influence of the concept of dignity
on the Court’s reasoning. The opinion acknowledged the innate
humanity of the impacted groups and confronted the “stigma” wrought
by the challenged statute 113—the validity of which hinged on Bowers, a
case that the Court declared “demean[ed] the lives of homosexual
persons” simply by existing as valid precedent. 114 Finally, the Court
demonstrated its willingness to move beyond traditional, “colorblind”
equal protection doctrine. Even though the issue lent itself easily to an
equal protection opinion, and though the language utilized “sounds
almost entirely in equal protection,” 115 the Court approached the
question as a due process issue. This approach gave stronger protection
to a historically subordinated group by forcing Texas to “level up” and
affirmatively grant the pursued right to everyone. 116
Against the backdrop of these precedents, the Court took up the
constitutionality of the same-sex-marriage bans at issue in Obergefell.
Before the opinion was released, legal analysts had theorized
numerous ways the Court might strike down the bans, many of which
focused on traditional applications of the Equal Protection Clause. 117
However, the Court followed none of these routes, and it mostly
eschewed the traditional avenues for analyzing Fourteenth

111. See Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 169 (“The Obergefell methodology is
strikingly different from the Glucksberg methodology. It is much more akin to what Justice
Kennedy did in Lawrence.”).
112. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 99 (2003).
116. Id.; Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 69, at 173.
117. See, e.g., Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 147 (suggesting that the laws would not
have survived even deferential review); Ariel Schneller, How Justice Kennedy Could Have Baked
a Better Fortune Cookie, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2015, 4:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/laoe-0629-schneller-kennedy-20150629-story.html [https://perma.cc/XT8R-ZT3D] (proposing that
the Court could have declared sexual orientation a suspect classification and applied heightened
scrutiny); Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage – But Based on Dubious
POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
26,
2015),
Reasoning,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-onsame-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/?utm_term=.74f4b7fe0cee
[https://
perma.cc/CT2S-N7AY] (including among several alternative justifications that sexual orientation
could be covered by the heightened scrutiny that is applied to gender discrimination).
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Amendment claims, completely ignoring the conventional tiers of
scrutiny. 118 Instead, the opinion focused on the concept of equal
dignity, describing the challenged marriage laws as infringing on both
due process and equal protection rights in an intertwined, rather than
parallel, way. 119 Perhaps most importantly, the opinion did not ground
its holding in the type of formalistic, colorblind equality requirements
many expected, instead firmly embracing the values of
antisubordination. 120
The opinion began with a discussion of due process and the
fundamental right of marriage. 121 In discussing the uniquely
fundamental role marriage plays in American society, 122 however, the
Court focused in particular on the inherent dignity in the bond forged
between two people who make the choice to marry. 123 Revealingly, the
opinion spoke at length about the effects of same-sex-marriage bans on
the gay community, rather than on the simple fact of facial inequality.
The opinion stated that the bans taught “that gays and lesbians are
unequal in important respects.” 124
The Court then delved more directly into equal protection. After
laying out the interconnected nature of liberty and equality within the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 125 the Court continued to discuss the dignitary effects of
the challenged laws. Strikingly, the Court openly embraced
antisubordination, directly stating that “[t]he imposition of this
disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate
them.” 126 Importantly, the Court did not extend suspect-classification

118. The phrases “rational basis,” “intermediate scrutiny,” and “heightened scrutiny” do not
appear in the opinion. The phrase “strict scrutiny” appears only once, and even then only in a
description of a 1993 opinion by the Hawaiian Supreme Court. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2596–97 (2015). This is less surprising than one might think; the gay rights cases leading up
to Obergefell, as well as Obergefell itself, appear to show the Court drifting away from traditional
tiers of scrutiny. Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 530 (2014).
119. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–05; Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 172.
120. Boso, supra note 47, at 1133–34; see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“Especially against
a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians
serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”).
121. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
122. Id. at 2601.
123. Id. at 2599.
124. Id. at 2602.
125. Id. at 2602–03.
126. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added).
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status to sexual orientation. 127 Instead, the Court declared that the
challenged laws both “burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and . . .
abridge central precepts of equality,” and that they therefore violate
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 128 This elucidation
of the interwoven values of due process and equal protection serves as
the basis for the equal dignity approach taken up in this Note.
B. The Equal Dignity Approach to Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
Although Obergefell and its methodology encountered significant
opposition, 129 causing concern even among some supporters of the
LGBT rights movement, 130 the equal dignity approach rooted in
Obergefell provides a means for furthering the full freedom that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure. As the Court
described:
Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection . . .
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of [each] other. In any
particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.
This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of
what freedom is and must become. 131

This language is admittedly lacking clarity in terms of crafting a
workable methodology—a problem this Note attempts to solve by
providing a methodology for the equal dignity approach and by
discussing the need for this evolution of Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s “showy profundities” as
“profoundly incoherent” and “couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic”);
id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s musings [on dignity] are . . . deeply
misguided.”); Schneller, supra note 117 (calling the majority’s analysis “laughable”).
Interestingly, Justice Thomas has himself approvingly referenced dignitary effects in the
Fourteenth Amendment context. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (“[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment ‘added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship . . . .’”
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
130. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Anthony Kennedy’s Same-Sex Marriage Opinion Was a Logical
Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122210/anthonykennedys-same-sex-marriage-opinion-was-logical-disaster [https://perma.cc/NPX8-YAGW] (“It
was the correct ruling, but John Roberts’s dissent completely outmatched him.”); Somin, supra
note 117 (“Today’s Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage is a great result, but based on
dubious reasoning.”).
131. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (citations omitted).
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1. Equal Dignity: Approach and Methodology. Perhaps the most
important aspect of the equal dignity approach in Obergefell was the
Court’s apparent embrace of the antisubordination principle.
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed equal protection questions
through a narrowly structured, colorblind approach that focuses less on
ensuring true equality, and more on ensuring that the government does
not make decisions based on impermissible classifications. 132 Likely
due to concern over expanding this protection too far, the Court, over
time, stringently limited the classifications that were off-limits to the
government, focusing on a specific list of suspect classifications that are
analyzed under a tiers-of-scrutiny structure. 133 In Obergefell, the Court
had an easy out—expand the list of classifications to include sexual
orientation.
The Obergefell Court, however, took a different route, embracing
the remedial purpose behind the Fourteenth Amendment’s
interconnected clauses. The Court essentially ignored the suspectclassifications barrier that had been constructed under the traditional,
colorblind approach. Instead, the Court apparently decided that, in
light of the antisubordination concerns before it, the listed
classifications and associated tiers of scrutiny simply did not matter—
and accordingly did not even mention them. 134 The Court instead
analyzed the question under this antisubordination-based approach
and determined that the discrimination in question simply could not
stand.
This approach, taken a step further, can be applied with similar
effect to the discriminatory intent rule. In Obergefell, discriminatory
intent was not at issue—it was irrelevant because the same-sexmarriage bans were facially discriminatory. But to see how Obergefell
would deal with the rule, consider its treatment—or omission—of
suspect classifications. Under the Obergefell equal dignity approach,
focusing on only a short list of specific suspect classifications cannot
advance the vision of true equality embodied in the antisubordination
theory. Accordingly, doctrinal requirements that do not fit this
conception of equality should not limit the ability to ensure it. It follows
that the equal dignity approach would have a similar impact on the
discriminatory intent rule—a feature of the traditional, colorblind
approach that serves only to limit constitutional protection. Equal
132. See supra Part I.A (describing the colorblind equal protection approach and its
difference from the more remedial antisubordination view).
133. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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dignity, with antisubordination values at its core, is a remedial
approach for combatting serious inequality in all its forms. Even if the
government did not intend them, sufficiently harmful disparate
impacts continue to perpetuate inequality throughout American
society, including the exact racial inequality that spurred the enactment
of the Equal Protection Clause.
However, this approach is far from a wholesale endorsement of
disparate impact claims. Rather, a claim based on equal dignity
requires three elements: (1) significant, persuasive evidence of a
disproportionate impact on (2) a historically subordinated group, 135
which (3) either infringes on a fundamental liberty right or implicates
substantial liberty interests. 136 A disparate impact claim that presents
evidence of these factors should then be weighed against the
government’s interests in sustaining the challenged practice or law. The
court should then determine whether the challenged law infringes on
substantive equality severely enough to overcome the government’s
interests and thus warrant being struck down.
The first two elements of this equal dignity claim are centered in
the antisubordination principle. In the simplest terms, the
antisubordination theory mandates that when a court attempts to
determine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections and
rights, “one of the major inputs into any such analysis will be the impact
of granting or denying such [protection] to historically subordinated
groups.” 137 By acknowledging that rectifying this historical inequality
inherently works to fulfill the Amendment’s purpose and promise, the
antisubordination theory provides an avenue for the Court to move
beyond the discriminatory intent requirement in special
circumstances. 138 It is also in keeping with the Court’s prior history, a
history in which antisubordination ideals have long been embraced

135. One admitted difficulty will be determining how courts should establish what constitutes
a historically subordinated group and what makes this calculation different from the already
defunct process by which the Court identifies suspect classifications. Yoshino attempts to solve
this through examples like polygamists, which he thinks would not qualify as a subordinated
group. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 177–79. For now, it suffices to say that the
definition of “historically subordinated” groups is clearly broader than that of suspect
classifications because its origins in the gay rights cases show that it necessarily includes sexual
orientation.
136. For an explanation of equal dignity’s specific focus on liberty interests, see infra notes
139–45 and the accompanying discussion.
137. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 174.
138. Tribe, supra note 43, at 19.
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outside the equal protection context 139 and in which dignity-based
reasoning has been prevalent. 140
This background helps explain the third element of equal dignity
analysis. As Professor Kenji Yoshino highlights, the Court has a long
history of implicitly utilizing the interconnectedness of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses’ liberty and equality protections. Listing
cases going back a century, he outlines examples of where the Court
has leaned on due process liberty analysis to “further equality concerns
[for] indigent individuals, national origin minorities, racial minorities,
religious minorities, sexual minorities, and women,” 141 and of where
the Court has relied on equal protection to “protect certain liberties,
such as the right to travel, the right to vote, and the right to access the
courts.” 142 As part of acknowledging the remedial purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 143 the Obergefell Court simply went one step
further. By explicitly and specifically recognizing the connection
between “rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection,” 144 the Court demonstrated that the interwoven
139. As Yoshino highlights, the Court has maneuvered around the limits of equality doctrine:
“[Recent equal protection cases] signal the end of equality doctrine as we have known it. The end
of traditional equality jurisprudence, however, should not be conflated with the end of protection
for subordinated groups.” Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 748. Instead,
“the Court has shut doors in its equality jurisprudence . . . and opened doors in its liberty
jurisprudence to compensate.” Id. at 750. See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 115 (2007), arguing that the
Warren Court’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause was an
extension of its civil rights jurisprudence, in which the Justices recognized the racial and wealth
disparities of the era, and Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 174, saying, “What emerges
from Lawrence and Obergefell is a vision of liberty that I will call ‘antisubordination liberty.’”
140. Justice Brennan invoked dignity in thirty-nine of his opinions on the Court, Leslie
Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2011), and he asserted
that the Constitution proclaims a “bold commitment by a people to the ideal of dignity protected
through law.” William J. Brennan, My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE
BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 17, 18 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds.,
1997). Justice Kennedy also infused the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), and his concurring opinion in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), with the language and emphasis of human dignity, a sign that Kennedy’s view of the
concept within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence was not limited to gay rights. Tribe, supra
note 43, at 22–23.
141. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 749–50 (citing to examples of such
cases) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 750 (citing to examples of such cases) (citations omitted). See also id. at 788–92
(describing this history in greater detail).
143. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (describing the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s authors).
144. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). While an argument could be made
that the Due Process Clause’s protections for life and property should also be included, the
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relationship between the two Clauses provides a doctrinal basis for
“compensat[ing] for judicial retrenchment under the [traditional]
equal protection” doctrine. 145
What comes from this interconnection is an understanding that
inequality is most damaging when it occurs in connection with the
liberty interests that are central to American life. The most obvious
examples of such interests are fundamental rights, such as the right to
marriage that was at the core of Obergefell. However, an explicitly
recognized fundamental right may not be necessary for an equal
dignity claim if the inequality is great enough. Just as the Court has
recognized the potency of such hybrid, cumulative claims in the First
Amendment context, 146 so too should strong enough evidence of
inequality lessen the need for a previously declared right in the equal
dignity context. Instead, being able to point to substantial liberty
interests—such as jury participation, which is central to the American
justice system—should be enough to make out an equal dignity claim
where the disparate impact is exceptionally strong.
Helpfully, the antisubordination theory also provides a built-in
limiting principle. 147 Because equality concerns for historically
subordinated groups would be a necessary but not sufficient factor in
the court’s balancing, any argument for extending equal dignity
protection would have to overcome the government’s oftentimes
important interests and the counterarguments of the opponents of
expansive constitutional protections. 148 To tip the scale in favor of the
rare decision to strike down state action, parties would have to identify
serious inequality and specific liberty interests. They should fail,

Obergefell Court specifically mentions only this interconnection between liberty rights and
equality rights.
145. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 792.
146. The Court has previously recognized the power of “hybrid” claims of constitutional
protection, even where one claim on its own might not suffice. See, e.g., Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (discussing the potential for reinforcing a possibly unsuccessful
Free Exercise Clause claim with other First Amendment challenges, such as freedom of
association, speech, or the press). Given this acceptance of explicitly hybrid claims based on
different clauses of the First Amendment, the interwoven application of equality and liberty
ideals seems to be within the judiciary’s capabilities.
147. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 175.
148. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting in part) (“The Court . . . comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))).
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regardless of how convincing their arguments may be, if they cannot
fully elucidate how the antisubordination principle is being violated.149
2. The Need for Equal Dignity. The focus on human dignity that
sits at the core of the antisubordination principle, and therefore the
equal dignity approach, embodies and furthers substantive equality. 150
As described above, the direct purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
and its clauses was to protect black Americans from horrific societal
and legal treatment. 151 In the wake of Lawrence, Professor Christopher
A. Bracey discussed the implications of the Court’s emphasis on human
dignity for racial jurisprudence, proclaiming that “[d]ignity remains the
core aspirational value in the struggle for racial justice.” 152 Running
through the words and works of black thinkers from Frederick
Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr., to Claude McKay and Tupac
Shakur, Bracey asserted that the fight for racial justice in this nation is,
at its core, a fight for the full recognition of human dignity. 153
Equal dignity thus forces Americans to reckon with slavery and its
legacy. The Supreme Court itself made clear the pre–Civil War legal
status of the black community, declaring that the question whether
dignitary concerns applied to black Americans had a simple answer:
“[T]hey had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” 154 It
149. This is the tool through which Tribe and Yoshino attack Justice Roberts’s argument that
the Obergefell majority repeated the sins of Lochner. Tribe, supra note 43, at 17–18; Yoshino, A
New Birth, supra note 45, at 175. In Lochner, the Court depended on a “right of contract” in
striking down a labor statute that limited the working hours of bakers. Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 53 (1905). This decision merely demonstrates the extent to which that Court erred:
Lochner was simply mistaken about the true vulnerability of the groups involved, and the opinion
was grossly misguided in its attempt to provide protection and equality. Yoshino, A New Birth,
supra note 45, at 175. Similarly, under equal dignity, a court necessarily must give genuine weight
to the government’s interests, which in the case of the New York minimum-hours law challenged
in Lochner was a distinctly persuasive worker-protection argument. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 51
(quoting Julius M. Mayer, Att’y Gen. of the State of N.Y.). Such strong government interests
should win out under equal dignity analysis.
150. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Procreation: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736 (2008) (“[C]onstitutional protections for dignity
vindicate, often concurrently, the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”).
151. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
152. Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 669
(2005).
153. Id. at 669–72.
154. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 408 (1857). A particularly evocative example is the
process by which racial identity was determined in court, in which a racially ambiguous individual
was often forced to present “himself to the jury for ‘inspection,’ turning in all directions, taking
off his shoes for examination of his feet, opening his mouth to reveal his teeth, removing his shirt,
[and] showing his fingernails.” Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White Cultural Approaches to
Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 652 (2001).
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was these infamous words, proclaimed by Chief Justice Roger Taney
in one of the Court’s most reviled decisions, 155 against which the
Reconstruction Amendments were reacting. It is this history of
purposeful, focused efforts to dehumanize black Americans and deny
them dignity that should influence our reading and application of those
Amendments. 156 Similar accounts could, and have, been given of
America’s historical treatment of Native Americans, 157 Chinese and
Japanese Americans, 158 women, 159 the LGBT community, 160 and more.
Through equal dignity, the courts can continue the process of righting
these wrongs.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that many of the criticisms of this
equal dignity approach—and of the Court’s reliance on lofty ideals and
vague, honorable-sounding values—are valid. Obergefell truly does
lack the clear doctrinal lines and limitations that the Court has
attempted to build into its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and
its reasoning simply is not as straightforward or as predictably
replicable as the dissents’ narrower reasoning would have been. But
this does not mean that the equal dignity approach is incorrect,
indefensible, or unworthy of a place in the larger constitutional
scheme. The goals of the Fourteenth Amendment do not always lend
155. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (“There is a stock
answer to the question [of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions] . . . . We know these cases by
their petitioners: Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu.” (citations omitted)).
156. See generally Peggy Cooper Davis, Responsive Constitutionalism and the Idea of Dignity,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1373, 1373 (2009) (arguing “that our understanding of the basic rights set
out in the Reconstruction Amendments should be contextualized by an appreciation of the
Amendments’ anti-slavery origins”).
157. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1971) (providing a historical account of American western
expansion and of the concentrated governmental efforts to subordinate Native tribes).
158. See generally Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A
Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996) (discussing the history and legacy
of the internment of Japanese Americans); Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving
Racial Identity: Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian
Americans, 1910-1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the application of antimiscegenation laws
to Asian Americans); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle For Civil Rights In Nineteenth
Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984) (describing civil rights
abuses of Chinese Americans in the nineteenth century).
159. See generally Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for
Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (1994)
(describing the historical discrimination against women and comparing it to racial discrimination
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
160. See generally SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY (2008) (describing the history
of the transgender community); Ralph Slovenko, The Homosexual and Society: A Historical
Perspective, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445 (1985) (describing the history of discrimination against
gay and lesbian people).
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themselves to such a constrained reading or interpretation. Its authors
were attempting to establish true racial equality, something that the
men who had just finished fighting the Civil War would have been
perfectly aware would not be as simple as establishing a three-part
tiered-scrutiny structure.
The Court’s attempt to create simple tests for vague
Constitutional clauses is noble, but that does not mean that that is
always the correct path forward. 161 Clear doctrinal lines and blunt
reasoning are worthwhile goals, but they are not necessarily the right
means for achieving some of our predecessors’ loftier aims. Equal
dignity is not as straightforward or easily applicable as current equal
protection jurisprudence, and its potential for abuse as an even broader
version of substantive due process is real. These are reasons to invoke
equal dignity sparingly, and they help explain why the same-sexmarriage bans were the first time the approach was so openly utilized.
But in the rare case of true injustice, of a law or legal structure that
promotes the type of lasting and damaging inequality that the
Fourteenth Amendment is specifically designed to combat, equal
dignity is a valid legal doctrine.
Admittedly, the future of this view of the Fourteenth Amendment
has recently been thrown into some doubt. The retirement of
Obergefell’s author, Justice Kennedy, has generated genuine concerns
regarding the future of the jurisprudence he spearheaded. 162 Beyond
the loss of the Justice who wrote each of the most relevant recent
opinions, the confirmation process for his replacement, Justice
Kavanaugh, raised concerns that Kavanaugh, despite having clerked
for Kennedy, will diverge from this part of his legacy. 163 And, notably,
161. Even Chief Justice John Roberts has questioned the routine adoption of such tests.
During oral argument for District of Columbia v. Heller, he responded skeptically to arguments
regarding transporting traditional scrutiny standards into a new area of constitutional doctrine:
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are proposed,
“compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly tailored,” none of them appear
in the Constitution . . . .
. . . I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed
over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07290).
162. See, e.g., Did Justice Kennedy Just Destroy His Own Legacy?, POLITICO MAG. (June 27,
2018, 8:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/magazine/amp/story/2018/06/27/anthony-kennedylegacy-supreme-court-218900? [https://perma.cc/KV6W-5MEC] (reporting legal scholars’
arguments that Kennedy’s retirement “has undermined much of the good he has done” and that
his legacy “might very well amount to dust”).
163. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, In Kavanaugh’s Non-Answer on Same-Sex Marriage, Many
(Sept. 7, 2018),
Heard a
Troubling
Response, WASH. POST: THE FIX
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none of the other current members of the Court’s conservative wing
ever joined one of Kennedy’s gay rights opinions. 164
Another central question is whether, without Kennedy utilizing
his position as the Court’s swing Justice, there remains any genuine
support for his approach. Given the narrow majorities in the gay rights
cases, the liberal Justices had little choice but to sign on to Kennedy’s
reasoning. Had there been a genuine liberal majority, a more expansive
view of equal protection—and the declaration of a new suspect
classification—might have carried the day. 165 In fact, it seems genuinely
likely that an opinion written by one of the current Court’s four liberal
Justices would have been based in a more explicit declaration of sexual
orientation as a suspect classification, which would have provided a
more concrete basis for protecting the LGBT community.
For now, it is impossible to predict whether we have seen the last
of equal dignity and its reasoning. But the criticisms of Obergefell are
exactly why this Note was written: to help provide a greater level of
workability and applicability to a deeply humane yet frustratingly
unclear opinion so that this dignity-based approach can have staying
power. Simply put, Kennedy’s view of dignity has been infused into
much of our constitutional doctrine. Those looking to continue
extending equality protections may view the existing doctrine of
Obergefell, Lawrence, and Romer as a more likely route than
expanding our long-stagnant colorblind approach to equal protection.
Predicting the future development of law in this field is a tricky and
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/kavanaughs-non-answer-same-sexmarriage-many-heard-troubling-answer/?utm_term=.da66ac7441d2
[https://perma.cc/6SNS6VQB] (arguing that Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing “likely reaffirmed the fears of gay
Americans” that “judges would allow for further discrimination against gay people under the
guise of religious objections”).
164. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito dissented in both cases for which they were on
the Court: Obergefell and Windsor. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 802 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas has dissented
in all four of the gay rights cases. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Windsor,
570 U.S. at 778 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). And Justice
Gorsuch—though not on the Court for any of the four cases—appears to have a very narrow view
of the actual reach of Obergefell. Despite Obergefell’s holding that same-sex couples are entitled
to “civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples,” Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2605, Gorsuch dissented from a subsequent per curiam decision holding that both members
of a same-sex married couple have the right to have their names on a child’s birth certificate; he
argued that Obergefell did not even speak to the issue. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
165. See, e.g., Beutler, supra note 130 (“[T]he price of admission for the Court’s four liberals
was to join a muddled, unconvincing opinion.”).
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perhaps impossible task; in the years after Bowers, one would have
been hard-pressed to believe that an opinion like Obergefell was
coming. But given the precedential value of Obergefell and its
predecessors, attempting to develop a clearer approach for applying its
reasoning to new cases is a necessary and worthwhile task.
III. APPLYING EQUAL DIGNITY TO JUROR-EXCLUSION LAWS
In the short time since Obergefell was decided, scholars have
advocated for a bevy of new rights and protections. 166 Although many
of those arguments have persuasive reasoning, they also demonstrate
the pandora’s box concerns that animated the Court’s earlier doctrinal
decisions. 167 A more sensible application, and one that is more in line
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose, focuses on certain
disparate impact claims. This Part provides an example of such equal
dignity analysis, applying the framework outlined above to the
exclusion of felons from the jury pool.
A. The Antisubordination Concerns of Exclusion Laws
The first step under equal dignity analysis is necessarily an analysis
of the three requirements outlined above. The first requirement is
easily met in this context. A highly disproportionate 168 30 percent of
felons come from a group that comprises only 12.6 percent of the total
population, 169 and possibly more than 33 percent of all black adult
males are disqualified from federal jury service for life. 170 Given this,
there is little question that juror-exclusion laws have a significant
disparate impact. There is an obvious aspect of personal choice to
engage in criminalized behavior, but the reality is that the elevated
166. See, e.g., Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, And Damned If They Don’t: Prototype
Theories to End Punitive Policies Against Pregnant People Living in Poverty, 18 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 283, 312 (2017) (“By urging us to consider the discriminatory effects of government practices
on particular groups, [Obergefell’s] articulation of ‘equal dignity’ provides a new way to challenge
Medicaid abortion coverage bans . . . .”). See generally Maxine D. Goodman, The Obergefell
Marriage Equality Decision, with Its Emphasis on Human Dignity, and a Fundamental Right to
Food Security, 13 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 149 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell can serve
as the basis for a fundamental right to food security); Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right
to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915 (2016) (outlining Obergefell’s impact on a potential
fundamental right to education).
167. See supra note 82 (discussing the Court’s concerns regarding expansive constitutional
protection).
168. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (describing disproportionate racial
statistics regarding felon status and exclusion from jury pools).
169. Kalt, supra note 9, at 171.
170. Id. at 114.
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focus on black communities and black men in policing plays an
inescapable role in felon statistics and racial disparities in criminal
convictions. 171
Second, the black community is perhaps the single clearest
example of a historically subordinated group. Beyond this, just as the
same-sex-marriage bans in Obergefell had subordinating impacts on
gay and lesbian people, 172 so too does felon-juror exclusion impact the
black community, regardless of the intent underlying it. Polling shows
that nearly two-thirds of black Americans between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-nine have no confidence in the ability of the legal system to
judge people without racial bias. 173 It may be impossible to separate out
the factors that contribute to this lack of confidence, but the racial
makeup of juries seems likely to play a role. 174 And as discussed above,
studies have repeatedly demonstrated the powerfully negative impact
that less-diverse juries can have on trial outcomes, 175 impacts that
appear inevitable so long as laws continue to exclude massive
percentages of minority communities from juror eligibility. Jurorexclusion laws work to further distance the black community from a
criminal justice system that many already do not trust.
Research also supports the argument that felon-juror exclusion
leads to people distrusting their government and doubting their own
self-worth in society. One study has found that exposure to the criminal
justice system, and the lifelong impacts it brings, leads many to
“become deeply distrustful of political authorities, have little faith that
the state will respond to the will of the people, and believe they are not
‘full and equal’” 176—attitudes that are antithetical to true
rehabilitation. Alternatively, research conducted in Maine, the only
state without a felon-exclusion law, suggests that inclusion in the jury
pool actually has beneficial impacts, with the felons in that study
171. As civil rights lawyer and scholar Michelle Alexander notes:
A black kid arrested twice for possession of marijuana may be no more of a repeat
offender than a white frat boy who regularly smokes pot in his dorm room. But because
of his race and his confinement to a racially segregated ghetto, the black kid has a
criminal record, while the white frat boy, because of his race and relative privilege, does
not.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 132 (2010).
172. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
173. Harvard IOP Spring 2016 Poll, supra note 30.
174. Fukurai & Davies, supra note 30, at 665 (discussing polling that found that 67 percent of
respondents believed racially diverse juries reach more fair decisions than single-race juries.).
175. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (describing the impact of racial diversity
on jury deliberations).
176. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 15 (2014).
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reporting that jury eligibility helped them feel more included in society
after their release. 177 In fact, the results demonstrated “that juror
eligibility facilitates changes in convicted felons’ self-concepts,
promoting prosocial identity transformation, tempering the stigma of
a felony conviction and prompting the discovery of self-worth.” 178
With the first two equal dignity elements established, the analysis
then moves to the liberty interests impacted by juror exclusion.
Although the lower courts have never recognized a fundamental right
to jury service 179 and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue,
the sacrosanct position of the jury in both the American legal system
and civic life is undeniable. When the Founders chose to declare their
independence from the British Empire, they specifically included
among the complaints levied against King George III his “depriving us
in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” 180 The Framers of the
Constitution viewed the jury as such a foundational aspect of the legal
system that they included it twice in the Bill of Rights, in both the
Sixth 181 and Seventh 182 Amendments.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the indispensable nature
of the jury, declaring it “essential for preventing miscarriages of
justice.” 183 Juries are viewed as a central part of our civic community
and as a safeguard of liberty 184 that works to prevent government
oppression. 185 The views of the American public reflect this history:
two-thirds of Americans regard jury service a “part of what it means to
be a good citizen.” 186 Just as importantly, it has long been believed that
“a jury verdict in a criminal case is fair because it is the decision of the
defendant’s peers.” 187 Juror-exclusion laws remove a quarter of all

177. James M. Binall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on
Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 20–24 (2018).
178. Id. at 21.
179. Kalt, supra note 9, at 88.
180. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to trial by “an
impartial jury”).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (guaranteeing a right to jury trial in civil suits).
183. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 158 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment
against the states).
184. Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 47 (2006).
185. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
186. John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, But Most Americans See It as Part of Good
Citizenship, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship/ [https://
perma.cc/KJK7-S5QS].
187. Mazzone, supra note 184, at 39.
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black adults from this communal American civic duty and ensure that
black defendants often do not receive the same judgment of their
peers. Even without a declared fundamental right, bans as sweeping as
the current juror-exclusion laws inherently implicate strong liberty
interests.
B. The Government’s Interests in Sustaining Juror-Exclusion Laws
Having established a prima facie equal dignity claim, the next step
is assessing the government’s interests in sustaining laws that ban
felons from jury service. The government’s main interests in such laws
have been threefold: protecting the probity of the jury, 188 avoiding
antiprosecution bias on the part of felon jurors, 189 and sustaining a legal
practice that has a long-standing historical basis in the British commonlaw jury tradition. 190 These interests are legitimate; the government
undoubtedly has an interest in ensuring that juries are as fair, unbiased,
and moral as they can be. Unsurprisingly, these interests have
consistently been successful under the rational basis review they have
encountered. 191 However, under the equal dignity approach, the
question is whether the government’s stated justifications for banning
felons from serving on juries truly outweigh the constitutional concerns
raised.
The argument that banning felons will help protect the jury’s
probity runs into a basic problem. Though individuals convicted of
crimes might be innately less moral or less law abiding, that assumption
is less persuasive in a criminal justice system run through with racial
inequality. The American system is one in which black drug possessors
are almost four times more likely to be arrested for possession of
certain drugs than whites, despite nearly identical usage rates across
racial lines. 192 Whites are also consistently “more successful than
188. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The government
has a legitimate interest in protecting the probity of juries.”).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We believe,
furthermore, that it is rational to assume that persons currently facing felony charges may be
biased against the government . . . .”).
190. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 9, at 91 (“[F]elon exclusion was practiced at common law, long
before black people—felons or non-felons—had any chance to serve on juries. Thus, imputing
racial animus to the historical practice of felon exclusion is difficult.” (citation omitted)).
191. See, e.g., Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding a felonexclusion law on the grounds of felons’ inherent bias); Arce, 997 F.2d at 1127 (upholding the
federal felon-exclusion law on grounds of probity).
192. E.g., Dylan Matthews, The Black/White Marijuana Arrest Gap, in Nine Charts, WASH.
POST:
WONKBLOG
(June
4,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2013/06/04/the-blackwhite-marijuana-arrest-gap-in-nine-charts/?utm_term=.0a4ca9958d1a
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nonwhites ‘at virtually every stage of pretrial negotiation’” 193 with
“[b]lacks . . . convicted more frequently than whites for the same
crime.” 194 In fact, the Supreme Court felt compelled to overturn a
criminal conviction that was tainted by improper considerations of race
in the jury-selection process just two years ago. 195
Given this reality, the connection between prior convictions and
morality seems more tenuous. In fact, some of the key aspects of the
criminal justice system push against using prior criminal history as a
proxy for moral judgment. 196 Although retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation are similarly considered legitimate theories of
punishment, 197 rehabilitation is the basic goal underlying the parole
system 198 that oversees nearly 80 percent of released state prisoners. 199
Research also suggests that “[a]fter an ex-offender evidences sufficient
rehabilitation, the criminal record largely loses its relevance as an
accurate predictor of contemporary behavior.” 200
This does not mean that it is illogical to assume that one who has
committed previous felonies is less likely to respect the moral and legal
norms of the community; with recidivism rates being as high as they
are, 201 it is reasonable for a legislature to conclude that it is more
efficient to ban all felons from jury participation and only pick from
[https://perma.cc/7SAC-92YM]. As Professor James E. Coleman, Jr., explains, if our drug laws
were neutrally applied, “most arrests likely would take place on college campuses . . . rather than
[in] poor minority neighborhoods.” Will Doran, In a New Survey, Powerful North Carolinians
Agree on Weed But Not Guns, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 22, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/influencers/article220314765.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZNL-UW74].
193. Daniel S. Goldman, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and
Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 629 (2004) (quoting MARC MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE 138 (1999)).
194. Id.
195. See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (holding that the prosecutor’s striking
of two black prospective jurors violated the defendant’s constitutional rights).
196. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 10, at 610–14 (describing the tensions between felon-juror
exclusion and American reintegrative goals for former prisoners).
197. E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–72 (2010).
198. See, e.g., id. at 73 (describing rehabilitation as “a penological goal that forms the basis of
parole systems”).
199. Reentry Trends in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Jan. 6, 2019),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/releases.cfm#methodr [https://perma.cc/J72D-ZV36].
200. T.W. Brown, Note, An Argument for Easing Felony Expungement in Arkansas, 65 ARK.
L. REV. 751, 753 (2012).
201. See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES
IN 2005, at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JJC3-MTBL] (showing that over three-quarters of released prisoners are rearrested within five
years).
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the rest of the population. However, the Court itself has firmly
established that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
democratic government.” 202
Although the government’s second interest in juror-exclusion
laws, avoiding antiprosecution bias, presents a slightly more complex
argument, it is similarly unpersuasive. In fact, many courts have
seemed surprisingly unconcerned when it is revealed that seated jurors
should have been disqualified due to prior criminal history. 203 Such
individuals end up on juries with at least some frequency, oftentimes
due to their failure to properly disclose criminal history. 204 But when
faced with such a scenario, numerous state courts, 205 as well as the
Eighth 206 and Ninth Circuits, 207 have decided that the inclusion of such
a person does not always create a genuine issue. The Michigan
Supreme Court recently made this determination explicitly, stating,
“we fail to see how a juror’s mere status as a convicted felon can be
considered sufficient” for determining impartiality or bias, despite
Michigan’s clear felon-exclusion law. 208 If the very courts these laws are
meant to protect have little problem with the inclusion of felons on
their juries, the bias justification for the laws does not carry much
weight.
Actual rates of bias also do not seem to support full exclusion.
Although researchers have found that “few if any juror characteristics
are good predictors of juror verdict preferences,” 209 there has been
little specific research into the presence of bias in jurors with prior
202. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
203. Kalt, supra note 9, at 162.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., White v. State, 225 S.W.3d 571, 574–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that the
presence of two jurors who should have been disqualified by statute due to pending criminal
charges did not amount to “significant harm” on its own); State v. Neal, 550 So. 2d 740, 745 (La.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a juror’s failure to disclose a prior felony conviction was not cause
for a new trial).
206. See United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming a
conviction where an embezzler sat on a jury that convicted the defendant of income tax evasion,
and reasoning that there was a lack of evidence of actual bias on the part of the juror).
207. See Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
conviction due to a lack of evidence of “actual bias” on the part of a felon juror).
208. People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 859 (Mich. 2008) (emphasis in original).
209. Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer
Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 622, 673 (2000).
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criminal history. One study does admittedly point to a noticeable
antiprosecution bias demonstrated by about one-third of felons. 210
However, this research also suggests that taken as a whole, felons are
not overly biased. In fact, almost one-third of felons were either neutral
or favorable to the prosecution. 211 And the level of antiprosecution bias
that felons do demonstrate is identical to that of other nonbanned
groups; the bias rate is particularly similar to that of law students. 212
These results may not entirely refute the bias argument, but the lack of
a stronger correlation between felon status and bias does undermine
the justification for the lifetime bans that much of the country
utilizes. 213 Prosecutors are also fully capable of discovering prospective
jurors’ biases by direct questioning, just as they root out other forms of
potential bias or conflicts of interest. 214
Finally, though it is certainly true that historical practice has at
times played some role in upholding challenged laws, 215 courts and
legislatures have also consistently excised practices that introduced
unfairness and prejudice into the legal system. 216 It is also important to
note that the American criminal justice system—including the rate and
total number of felony convictions—has changed dramatically even
within recent decades; the number of state felony convictions increased
24 percent between 1994 and 2004, 217 and researchers have estimated
that the percentage of felons more than doubled between 1968 and
2000. 218 Accordingly, felon-juror-exclusion laws have a larger, more
widespread impact now than at any other point in American history.
When dealing with human lives and the malignant force of racial bias,
the existence of a long legal history is simply not enough.

210. James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support
for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL’Y 1, 17–19 (2014).
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id.
213. Kalt, supra note 9, at 106.
214. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 407 (arguing that prosecutors can discover prospective
jurors’ bias, such as antipolice bias, “through explicit questions about such biases”).
215. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer under
the Establishment Clause in light of the long historical tradition of this practice).
216. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (establishing the Miranda
warnings to protect individuals from abusive and coercive police questioning); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule against the states to protect
defendants from illegally obtained evidence); FED. R. EVID. 412 (protecting victims of sexual
assault from having their sexual history paraded in court).
217. Darren Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: The Racial Impact of Felon Jury Exclusion
in Georgia, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 335, 337 (2011).
218. Kalt, supra note 9, at 169 (citation omitted).
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C. Results: The Harshest Felon-Juror Exclusion Laws are
Unconstitutional
Ultimately, the pressing constitutional concerns raised by
excluding felons from the jury pool outweigh the government’s
unconvincing justifications, and the lifelong bans currently enforced by
the federal government and thirty-one states violate equal dignity and
should not stand. Whether shorter term bans or other temporary forms
of exclusion could survive equal dignity challenges is a question
requiring more in-depth analysis than this Note can provide. But
America is an organized society with a robust criminal justice system
that has the power to imprison and execute those it deems deserving.
In such a society, surely a belief in the idea that “all individuals are
deserving in equal measure of personal autonomy” 219 requires ensuring
the dignity and respect granted by a criminal justice system that is
generally representative and fair toward every community.
Simply striking down felon-juror-exclusion laws may not be
enough. The jury selection process is too idiosyncratic to ever fully
ensure that prosecutors will not use peremptory strikes and challenges
for cause to remove all felons, and such tactics can be utilized by clever
attorneys as a work-around for discriminatory motives. 220 However,
forcing prosecutors to use their limited peremptory challenges 221 rather
than broadly banning felons up-front may help to alleviate some of the
problem. Courts could also go a step further by formulating protections
against challenges based on criminal history; these protections could
mirror those formulated in Batson v. Kentucky, where the Court both
required attorneys to provide race-neutral reasons for using
preemptive strikes on potential jurors during voir dire and created a
structure for addressing claims of improper motivation for preemptive
strikes. 222 Issues like these are neither insurmountable nor beyond the
capabilities of the judiciary to address, and they should not stand in the
way of upholding constitutional promises.
219. Tribe, supra note 43, at 22.
220. See Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual,
and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 95 (2009) (“The
removal of African Americans for either familiarity with the criminal justice system or hostility
to the state and its agents is, most arguably, not race neutral.”).
221. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (describing limits for peremptory challenges in federal
criminal prosecutions).
222. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–98 (1986). A similar rule in this situation could
require attorneys to provide a more direct link between the crime the potential juror was
convicted of and the issues at stake in the instant case, rather than allowing broad strikes based
on the mere existence of a criminal record.
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The Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of fighting racial
discrimination makes it the correct tool for combatting this issue. In
theory, this includes fairness in policing, the charging of crimes, pretrial
negotiations, and sentencing; in reality, the murky, sometimes
unconscious nature of racial bias is such that there may be no foolproof
means for ensuring its absence from proceedings that include an
inevitable and necessary amount of discretion. 223 But when it can be
demonstrated that an unnecessary practice is systematically and
disproportionally excluding up to one-third of a particular race from
an important aspect of American life, that is an inequality that can be
tackled.
CONCLUSION
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court opened the door to a new way
of approaching questions of equal protection—an approach that both
provides an effective method for bringing disparate impact claims and
reinvigorates the Fourteenth Amendment’s remedial roots.
Admittedly, the harm inherent in excluding felons from the jury pool
would not have been recognized by the Amendment’s authors, who
were surrounded by racial injustice on a scale that is hard for modern
Americans to comprehend. However, the Court predicted and
forcefully addressed these concerns:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own
times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. 224

Fortunately, we have that new insight—the understanding that the
exclusion of felons from the jury pool exacerbates the exact racial
imbalances our predecessors hoped to stamp out. Despite obvious
detours and backward steps, the overall course of the American justice
system is one of recognizing and attempting to excise racial bias and
inequality. Rather than being a wild expansion away from the previous
path Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has taken, equal dignity,
223. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 619–21 (discussing the large number of discretionary
decisions necessary in the criminal justice system and the risk of implicit bias in these decisions).
224. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
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and this particular application, follows that clear direction. With each
passing year and generation, we try to move another step closer to true
equality. Striking down juror-exclusion laws, while far from solving
these problems, helps move us that next step.

